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OPINION 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
This appeal involves the application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause to the suspension of 
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policemen in Pennsylvania.  Michael Schmidt, an officer in 
Pennsylvania’s Capitol Police, claims that appellees, senior 
officers of the Capitol Police and officials of Pennsylvania’s 
Department of General Services, violated his due process 
rights when they failed to provide him a hearing before 
suspending him without pay.  In deciding this appeal, we 
keep in mind that, classified employees under Pennsylvania’s 
Civil Service Act cannot be suspended or terminated without 
just cause.1
                                                 
171 Pa. Stat. § 741.803 provides in pertinent part that 
“[a]n appointing authority may for good cause suspend 
without pay for disciplinary purposes an employe[e] holding 
a position in the classified service. . . .  What shall constitute 
good cause for suspension may be stated in the rules.”  See 
also 4 Pa. Code § 101.21(a) (defining “good cause” for 
suspension).  Similarly, 71 Pa. Stat. § 741.807 provides that 
“[n]o regular employe[e] in the classified service shall be 
removed except for just cause.”  The “good cause” and “just 
cause” standards are similar and Pennsylvania courts have 
applied the “good cause” standard in termination cases.  See 
Office of Att’y Gen. v. Colbert, 598 A.2d 344, 346 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1991); appeal dismissed 619 A.2d 1062 (Pa. 
1993) (citing 4 Pa. Code § 101.21(a)); Stone v. State 
Correctional Inst. at Graterford, 422 A.2d 1227, 1227-28 
(Pa. Commw. 1980) (same); but cf. Woods v. State Civil Serv. 
Comm’n, 590 Pa. 337, 344 (Pa. 2006) (employee’s arrest was 
“good cause” for suspension, but not “just cause” for 
termination because employee was not convicted and there 
was no evidence that arrest interfered with his duties). 
  This recognition of this property interest in their 
positions has been applied both to terminations and to 
suspensions.  See, e.g., Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 
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225, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).2  Absent extraordinary 
circumstances, the statute has been interpreted as creating a 
property interest requiring at least a brief and informal pre-
termination or pre-suspension hearing.3
 
  Id.   
In the case before us, the District Court held that, 
despite Schmidt’s property interest in his position, because 
there was a post-suspension hearing provided by the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), no pre-suspension 
hearing was necessary.  We now hold that, except for 
extraordinary situations, under Pennsylvania law, even when 
union grievance procedures permit a policeman to challenge 
his suspension after the fact, a brief and informal pre-
termination or pre-suspension hearing is necessary.  However, 
because this rule was not clearly established at the time of 
Schmidt’s suspension, we conclude that appellees are entitled 
to qualified immunity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2Dee considered the suspension of a fireman under 53 
Pa. Stat. § 46190, which imposes essentially the same 
limitations on suspension as the Civil Service Act.  Compare 
53 Pa. Stat. § 46190(1)-(6) with 71 Pa. Stat. § 741.803; 4 Pa. 
Code § 101.21(a)(1)-(6). 
3See, e.g., Bd. Of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972); Kelly v. Borough of Sayreville, 107 F.3d 1073, 1077 
(3d Cir. 1997) (holding state law creates property rights 
protected by Fourteenth Amendment). 
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I.  Background 
A. Schmidt’s Handling of Complaint Against 
Senior Capitol Police Officers 
 
Schmidt was hired in November 2002 by the 
Department of General Services (DGS) of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to serve as a patrol officer 
with Capitol Police.  On July 15, 2006, Schmidt had a 
scheduled shift at the Harristown post, an area of Harrisburg 
covering the Attorney General’s Office and the Rachel 
Carson Building.  Before his shift began, Schmidt was 
approached by a fellow officer, Kenneth Shaffer (Officer 
Shaffer), who wanted to file a complaint against his superior 
officers, Richard Shaffer, the Superintendent of the Capitol 
Police (Superintendent Shaffer),4
 
 Robert Dillard, Deputy 
Superintendent, and Robert J. Rapak, a Special Investigator.   
The parties dispute the nature of Officer Shaffer’s 
complaint:  according to appellees, Officer Shaffer merely 
wished to file a union grievance, but according to Schmidt, 
Officer Shaffer also wanted to file a criminal complaint.   
 
Officer Shaffer wanted to file the complaint because 
he believed he was about to be charged with misconduct by 
his supervisors in retaliation for his refusal to re-file charges 
against a suspect in an incident that he believed had already 
been resolved.5
                                                 
4Officer Kenneth Shaffer is not related to 
Superintendent Richard Shaffer.   
  Officer Shaffer wanted a union 
 5According to a report prepared by the Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) of the DGS, the incident had not 
6 
 
representative available when he was served with paperwork 
relating to his own alleged misconduct.  
 
Schmidt told Officer Shaffer that John Bruno, a fellow 
police officer and union representative, would be available 
soon.  After Bruno arrived, Officer Shaffer explained his 
complaint to Schmidt and Bruno.  Schmidt and Bruno then 
went to a dispatch center at a different location in order to 
access the Capitol Police’s computer system, which is called 
“METRO.”  METRO is used by most police agencies in the 
Harrisburg area.  Schmidt entered Officer Shaffer’s complaint 
into METRO.  Schmidt’s entry summarized the complaint 
against Superintendent Shaffer, Dillard, and Rapak and 
selected type “A” for each of them, indicating a status of 
“Accused.”   
 
The parties dispute whether Schmidt knowingly 
violated Capitol Police regulations and policies in making the 
METRO entry.  According to appellees, the dispatch center 
was outside of Schmidt’s duty area, and permission was 
required for Schmidt to enter the center and use the METRO 
system.  Schmidt claims that it was permissible for him to 
stop at the dispatch center on the way to his duty area and 
                                                                                                             
been resolved.  Summary charges had been filed against a 
person who had pushed and shoved Commonwealth 
employees including Officer Shaffer.  The charges were 
dismissed because Officer Shaffer failed to appear in court to 
testify regarding the charges.  When Officer Shaffer was 
ordered to re-file the charges, he refused.  He was notified 
that his refusal was being investigated and would be the 
subject of a pre-disciplinary conference scheduled for July 18, 
2006. 
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that, while the order not to go into the center or use METRO 
without permission had been communicated to supervisors, it 
had not been communicated to him or other junior officers.  
Moreover, Schmidt had a log-in and password for METRO.  
The parties also dispute the significance of the “A” entries 
made by Schmidt.  According to Schmidt, the “A” meant only 
that Shaffer had directly accused Superintendent Shaffer, 
Dillard, and Rapak.  According to appellees, the “A” also 
meant that there was probable cause to arrest the three senior 
officers on sight.  Schmidt did not believe that he needed to 
report the complaint up the chain of command before entering 
it into METRO. Appellees claim, however, that Capitol 
Police policy required Schmidt to report the complaint to his 
superiors before entering it.   
 
After Superintendent Shaffer learned that Schmidt had 
entered the complaint into METRO, he directed Schmidt’s 
supervisor, Sergeant Bistline, to make changes to the entry.  
Bistline printed out a copy of the complaint and then removed 
the entry from METRO.  After learning of Bistline’s actions, 
Schmidt confronted him, questioned him about removing the 
entry, and then told Bistline that he (Bistline) had “fucked 
up.”   
 
B.  Suspension of Schmidt 
 
Following the incident, Superintendent Shaffer 
arranged a meeting with Gregory Green, Director of the 
Bureau of Human Resources (HR) in the DGS, to discuss 
allegations of misconduct against Schmidt.  Superintendent 
Shaffer, Dillard, Rapak, and Connie Tennis (Chief of Labor 
Relations for HR) met with Green.  The Superintendent asked 
HR to handle the investigation of Schmidt because the 
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Superintendent, Dillard, and Rapak were accused in the 
complaint that had been entered by Schmidt.6  At 
Superintendent Shaffer’s direction, Rapak conducted a 
preliminary investigation into Schmidt’s conduct and 
provided his findings to Green and Tennis.7
 
   
Green concluded from the report that Schmidt had 
failed to report to his assigned post, had disobeyed work 
orders, and had showed disrespect and insubordination to his 
supervisor.  According to Green, this misconduct was serious 
enough to raise “issues of trust” with respect to Schmidt. For 
that reason, he recommended that Schmidt be suspended 
pending further investigation.  Green discussed the matter 
with Deputy Secretary of DGS Anne Rung, who was acting 
on authority delegated by DGS Secretary James Creedon.  
She approved Green’s recommendation.   
 
On July 18, 2006 – three days after Schmidt had 
entered the complaint into the METRO system – Schmidt was 
notified that he was suspended without pay from his position 
with the Capitol Police.  Schmidt was called into an office by 
Dillard and several officers, told he was being suspended, and 
provided with a letter concerning his suspension.  The letter, 
which was signed by Green on behalf of Secretary Creedon, 
explained that “the reason for this suspension was that you 
                                                 
 6Normally, Rapak, as head of the Office of 
Professional Responsibility, would be responsible for 
investigating allegations of misconduct by Capitol Police 
Officers.   
7The record indicates that Rapak gathered information 
but did not conduct any analysis. 
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allegedly were involved in the entry of information into the 
‘METRO’ system, which was intended to undermine the 
administration and operation of the Capitol Police.”  Included 
with the letter were excerpts from the Pennsylvania Civil 
Service Act concerning Schmidt’s rights under the Act, 
including a provision stating that, while an external 
investigation is pending, an employee under investigation 
could be suspended until the investigation was complete and 
up to 30 days thereafter.8
 
  The letter did not identify any rules 
or regulations that had been violated by Schmidt.   
The parties do not dispute that Schmidt was suspended 
without being provided a pre-disciplinary hearing.  According 
to Schmidt, local newspapers learned of his suspension and 
reported that he had been suspended for filing false reports; 
he found this humiliating.   
 
C.  Union Grievance and Investigation  
Ten days after his suspension, Schmidt filed a 
grievance with his union, the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 
85 (FOP), alleging that he had been suspended in violation of 
his constitutional right to due process.  The FOP represented 
Schmidt in the grievance process, which went to arbitration.  
After holding a hearing and considering the parties’ written 
submissions, on November 14, 2006, the arbitrator awarded 
Schmidt back pay, seniority, and benefits for the period 
starting with his suspension on July 18, 2006 through the date 
of the arbitral award.9
                                                 
8See 71 Pa. Stat. § 741.803 
   
9This description of the grievance proceedings is 
gleaned from the parties’ statements of material facts and 
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During Schmidt’s suspension, the OIG also conducted 
an investigation into Schmidt’s conduct, and Schmidt was 
interviewed as part of the investigation.  The OIG issued its 
report on February 5, 2007.  The report concluded that 
Schmidt and several other officers had deliberately entered 
the complaint into METRO in an effort to embarrass and 
discredit the Capitol Police.  The OIG found that Schmidt’s 
statements lacked consistency and truthfulness and concluded 
that this called into question Schmidt’s ability to effectively 
carry out his duties.   
 
On March 2, 2007, after the OIG’s report had been 
completed, Schmidt was notified by letter of a pre-
disciplinary conference.  The letter charged Schmidt with the 
following: 
 
Specifically, on July 15, 2006, you left your 
assigned duty post without permission, entered 
the ICMS area without authorization and 
entered information without authorization in the 
METRO system which was intended to 
undermine the administration and operation of 
the Capitol Police.  In addition, after learning 
that Sgt. Bistline removed the information from 
                                                                                                             
Schmidt’s deposition.  The collective bargaining agreement 
applicable to the Capitol Police and the papers from 
Schmidt’s union grievance proceedings are not in the record 
before us.  It appears that the arbitrator did not order Schmidt 
reinstated in the November 14 award.  It was not until April 
14, 2007 – after Schmidt’s termination – that he was ordered 
reinstated.   
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the METRO system, you became loud, 
argumentative and insubordinate towards Sgt. 
Bistline, used profanity and disrupted the 
workforce. 
The letter did not specifically refer to any rules or regulations 
prohibiting this conduct. 
 
 On March 9, Schmidt participated in a pre-disciplinary 
conference with Tennis and representatives from the FOP.  
He declined to respond to the allegations against him or to 
provide an explanation for his alleged conduct.  Schmidt 
contends that he could not respond to the charges because he 
had not been informed of the rules he allegedly violated.  
After the conference, Green recommended that Schmidt be 
terminated from the Capitol Police.  On March 14, 2007, 
Schmidt was notified by letter that he was terminated.10
                                                 
 10In June, 2004, Schmidt had been suspended for three 
days without pay as discipline for making inappropriate 
comments.  He invoked the FOP grievance procedure to 
challenge his suspension and was awarded back pay, but the 
suspension remained in effect.  Green took this prior incident 
into account in deciding to terminate Schmidt.   
  The 
termination letter gave the same description of Schmidt’s 
conduct as the March 2 notice of pre-disciplinary conference, 
and added:  “These actions violated numerous provisions and 
procedures of the Capitol Police Duty Manual, which you are 
bound by and expected to follow.”  Schmidt invoked the 
FOP’s grievance procedure to challenge his termination.  An 
arbitrator ultimately ordered him reinstated, but without back 
pay, seniority, or benefits for the period during which he was 
terminated.   
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D.  Suspension Litigation 
On July 2, 2007, Schmidt filed a two-count complaint 
naming as defendants Superintendent Shaffer, Creedon, 
Green, and Tennis, alleging that they had suspended him from 
the Capitol Police without providing an adequate hearing in 
violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Count I), and terminated him in 
violation of his First Amendment rights (Count II).  Schmidt 
sought money damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 
for “embarrassment, humiliation, and mental anguish” 
resulting from his suspension and termination, as well as back 
pay, front pay, interest, and compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
 
The District Court denied the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss on April 24, 2008, and the parties proceeded to 
discovery.  On February 18, 2009, the District Court granted 
in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.  Schmidt v. Creedon, No. 4:07-cv-1190, 
Memorandum and Order at 22 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2009).  The 
court granted summary judgment on all of Schmidt’s claims, 
except the due process claim arising from his suspension.11
                                                 
 11Summary judgment was granted on (1) Schmidt’s 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, because Schmidt had 
produced no evidence that there was a conspiracy to suspend 
and terminate him motivated by race or class-based animus, 
Schmidt, No. 4:07-cv-1190, Memorandum and Order at 10 
n.14; (2) his First Amendment retaliation claim because he 
failed to present any evidence other than temporal proximity 
showing that his termination resulted from his assertion of his 
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Id. at 19-21.  The District Court dismissed Schmidt’s claim 
arising from his termination because a due process claim for 
his termination was not pleaded in his complaint but was 
raised for the first time in his summary judgment papers.   
 
The court then turned to the merits of Schmidt’s 
suspension claim, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 570 (1972), for the proposition that “[b]efore a person is 
deprived of a protected interest, he must be afforded 
opportunity for some kind of a hearing, ‘except for 
extraordinary situations where some valid governmental 
interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until 
after the event.’”  Schmidt, No. 4:07-cv-1190, Memorandum 
and Order at 14.  Defendants had argued that because 
Schmidt “was a police officer entrusted with a firearm and 
assigned to protect the public, issues of trust, credibility, and 
judgment are the types of extraordinary situations that 
implicate a valid government interest justifying the failure to 
provide predeprivation process.”  Id. at 12.  The District 
Court found, however, that “a reasonable jury could infer that 
the three-day delay between the incident and the Plaintiff’s 
suspension, coupled with the time consumed by coordinating 
and conducting the . . . meeting [in which Schmidt’s 
suspension was discussed], indicates that the exigencies 
alleged by Defendants did not exist.”  Id. at 13-14.   
 
                                                                                                             
constitutional rights through the union grievance and 
arbitration procedure, id. at 19-22; and (3) his claims against 
Superintendent Shaffer because he failed to present sufficient 
evidence that Shaffer was involved in the decision to suspend 
him, id. at 17-19.  Schmidt does not challenge these rulings 
on appeal. 
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Defendants then moved for reconsideration of the 
denial of summary judgment, arguing that the union 
grievance procedures available to Schmidt constituted a 
constitutionally adequate alternative to a pre-deprivation 
hearing.  The District Court agreed: 
 
In Jackson v. Temple University, 721 F.2d 931, 
933 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit held 
that an arbitration proceeding provided an 
“alternative forum” that provided plaintiff with 
“essentially the same due process safeguards 
that would have been available through an 
unbiased hearing.”  In such circumstances, the 
Third Circuit has held that the dictates of due 
process have been satisfied because “the risk of 
an erroneous determination in the 
grievance/arbitration procedure is not large, and 
the value of an additional or substitute 
procedures is not great.”  Dykes v. [SEPTA], 68 
F.3d 1564, 1572 (3d Cir. 1995).  
Schmidt v. Creedon, No. 4:07-cv-1190, Memorandum and 
Order at 4-5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2009).  Because Schmidt had 
access to union grievance procedures to challenge his 
suspension, the court found this “type of post-deprivation 
process afforded to Plaintiff cures the defects in pre-
deprivation due process he received such that it brings the 
totality of Defendants’ conduct relative to Plaintiff’s 
suspension within the bounds of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 5.  Accordingly, the 
District Court granted summary judgment to appellees on 
Schmidt’s remaining claim.  Id. at 6.  Schmidt appealed the 
judgment of the  District Court.   
15 
 
 
E.  Termination Litigation 
While his appeal was pending, Schmidt filed a new 
complaint against the same defendants alleging that he had 
been terminated without due process.  Schmidt claimed that, 
because the notice of pre-disciplinary hearing only “vaguely 
asserted” the charges against him and did not identify the 
specific rules he was alleged to have violated, he was not 
given a true opportunity to defend himself at his pre-
termination hearing.  The District Court found that Schmidt’s 
due process claim for his termination was not barred by res 
judicata because he had not had an opportunity in the prior 
litigation to fully and fairly litigate it.  Schmidt v. Creedon, 
No. 09-cv-323, 2010 WL 411330, *5-6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 
2010).12
 
  On the merits, the court agreed with the defendants 
that there was no evidence that Shaffer was involved in 
Schmidt’s termination and that due process did not require 
that Schmidt be informed of the specific rules he was alleged 
to have violated at or prior to his pre-termination hearing.  Id. 
at *4-5, *7.  Schmidt again appealed.  We have consolidated 
Schmidt’s appeals and decide both in this opinion. 
II.  Discussion  
A.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction over both actions 
                                                 
12Because we will affirm the District Court’s 
determination that Schmidt was not denied due process in the 
notice provided prior to the termination hearing, we will not 
revisit the issue of res judicata. 
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brought by Schmidt under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction over the District Court’s final orders disposing of 
Schmidt’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review de 
novo district court orders granting or denying summary 
judgment,”  Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 
119, 124 (3d Cir. 2010), “apply[ing] the same test required of 
the district court and view[ing] inferences to be drawn from 
the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.”  Bayer v. Monroe Cnty. Children and 
Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 2009).  Our review 
is not limited to the reasoning of the court below and we 
“may affirm the district court on grounds different from those 
relied on by the district court.”  In re Mushroom Transp. Co., 
382 F.3d 325, 344 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
B.  Schmidt’s Suspension Claim 
Appellees’ assertion of qualified immunity shapes our 
analysis of Schmidt’s suspension claim.  Under the rule in 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), we consider first 
whether “the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated 
a constitutional right” and then, “if a violation could be made 
out . . . the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right 
was clearly established.”13
                                                 
13Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 230 (2009), 
limited Saucier, holding that “[b]ecause the two-step Saucier 
procedure is often, but not always, advantageous, the judges 
of the district courts and the courts of appeals are in the best 
position to determine the order of decisionmaking [that] will 
best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case.”  
For reasons that will become evident, the two-step Saucier 
procedure is the more helpful one in considering Schmidt’s 
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1. Absent Extraordinary Circumstances, 
Schmidt Had the Right to a Pre-
Suspension Hearing 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a State may 
not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  A 
procedural due process claim is subject to a “two-stage” 
inquiry:  (1) whether the plaintiff has “a property interest 
protected by procedural due process,” and (2) “what 
procedures constitute ‘due process of law.’”  Gikas v. Wash. 
Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 731, 737 (3d Cir. 2003).  The parties 
agree that the first prong is met:  Schmidt had a 
constitutionally protected property interest in not being 
terminated or suspended from his position as a Capitol Police 
Officer without good cause.  See Dee, 549 F.3d at 230 
(concluding that, under the Pennsylvania civil service statute, 
53 Pa. Stat. § 46190, a fireman has a property interest in not 
being suspended without just cause). 
 
The question here is whether the procedure followed in 
suspending Schmidt comports with due process.  In assessing 
what process is due, this Court considers the factors set out in 
Mathews v. Eldridge: 
 
First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural 
                                                                                                             
suspension claim. 
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safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail. 
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see Dee, 549 F.3d at 232 (applying 
Mathews framework to fireman suspended without pre-
deprivation hearing).  Although “[d]ue process is flexible and 
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands,” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, several general 
principles guide application of the Mathews test.  One 
“essential principle” is that “a deprivation of life, liberty, or 
property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case.’”14
 
  Biliski v. Red Clay 
Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 574 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 
2009) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 
532, 542 (1985)).  Accordingly, “[o]nly in ‘extraordinary 
situations where some valid government interest is at stake’ is 
it permissible to postpone the hearing until after the 
deprivation has already occurred.”  Dee, 549 F.3d at 233 
(quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n.7). 
As we have set out above, under Pennsylvania law, a 
policeman’s property interest in his job is protected from 
either termination or suspension, 71 Pa. Stat. §§ 741.803, 807, 
and due process therefore entitles him to a pre-suspension or 
                                                 
 14On the day he was suspended, Schmidt was provided 
with a letter explaining why he was being suspended without 
pay.  Schmidt does not claim that this notice was insufficient 
and thus we limit our analysis to whether Schmidt was 
entitled to a hearing prior to his suspension. 
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pre-termination hearing – albeit a brief and informal one.  See 
Dee, 549 F.3d at 233; Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia, 808 
F.2d 241, 243 (3d. Cir. 1986).  We therefore reaffirm our 
holding in Dee that, absent extraordinary circumstances, 
policemen cannot be suspended without pay unless there has 
been a pre-suspension hearing. 
 
Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997), does not alter 
our analysis.  There, the Supreme Court held that a police 
officer, who had been arrested and charged with drug 
possession, could be immediately suspended without a prior 
hearing.  Gilbert is not applicable here for two reasons.  First, 
the Court reasoned in Gilbert that because “the purpose of 
any pre-suspension hearing would be to assure that there are 
reasonable grounds to support the suspension,” and because 
“an independent third party [had already] determined that 
there [was] probable cause to believe the employee 
committed a serious crime,” there was adequate “assur[ance 
without a pre-suspension hearing] that the state employer’s 
decision to suspend the employee was not ‘baseless or 
unwarranted.’”  Id. at 933-34.  Here, Schmidt was only 
accused of wrongdoing by his superiors, and no such 
assurance would exist without a pre-suspension hearing.  
Second, the policeman in Gilbert was a university employee, 
and the parties did not address whether he was protected by 
the Civil Service Act.  The Court thus assumed without 
deciding that “the suspension infringed a protected property 
interest,” and therefore focused on the University’s 
contention that the policeman “received all the process he was 
due.”  Id. at 929.  Here, unlike the situation in Gilbert, it is 
conceded that Schmidt is a police officer subject to the Civil 
Service Act, which provides that both termination and 
suspension must be for cause, and are subject to similar 
20 
 
criteria, indicating that both implicate interests of comparable 
importance. 
 
Furthermore, we note that providing an opportunity to 
be heard prior to suspension without pay would not impose a 
significant administrative or fiscal burden on the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Ordinarily, a pre-
deprivation hearing “need not be elaborate.”  Loudermill, 470 
U.S. at 545.  Where adequate post-deprivation procedures are 
available, an employee is entitled only to “notice of the 
charges against him, an explanation of the employer's 
evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.”  
Id.  The hearing can be informal and “need not definitively 
resolve the propriety” of the deprivation.  Id.  “It should be an 
initial check against mistaken decisions – essentially, a 
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the charges against the employee are true and 
support the proposed action.”  Id.  An employee is generally 
not entitled to notice of the reasons for his discharge in 
advance of a pre-deprivation hearing, Gniotek, 808 F.2d at 
244, or to present his case to an impartial decision-maker at 
such a hearing, McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 460 (3d Cir. 
1995).  Appellees do not claim that providing such limited 
pre-suspension hearings would impose any administrative or 
fiscal burden on the Commonwealth.15
                                                 
 15We note that the standard applicable to suspension 
with pay is a more difficult question that we do not consider 
here.  See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544-45 & n.10 (“in those 
situations where the employer perceives a significant hazard 
in keeping the employee on the job, it can avoid the problem 
by suspending with pay”); Dee, 549 F.3d at 231 n.10 (“the 
fact that [the employee] was suspended with pay may—but 
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We therefore conclude that, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, due process requires notice and a hearing prior 
to suspension without pay, even where union grievance 
procedures, after the fact, fully compensate erroneously 
suspended employees.16
 
 
Appellees contend that our decisions in Dykes v. 
SEPTA, 68 F.3d 1564, 1575 (3d Cir. 1995), and Jackson v. 
Temple University, 721 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1983), hold that 
adequate post-deprivation grievance procedures render a pre-
deprivation hearing unnecessary.  We disagree.  These cases 
stand for the proposition that certain defects in post-
deprivation union grievance procedures do not violate due 
process because state law already provides remedies for such 
defects.  Specifically, “[w]here a due process claim is raised 
against a public employer, and grievance and arbitration 
procedures are in place, . . . those procedures satisfy due 
process requirements ‘even if the hearing conducted by the 
Employer . . . [was] inherently biased.’”  Dykes, 68 F.3d at 
1571 (quoting Jackson, 721 F.2d at 931).  Neither case 
supports the broader claim advanced by appellees that a pre-
deprivation hearing is unnecessary when post-deprivation 
union grievance and arbitration procedures are available. 
 
                                                                                                             
need not necessarily—be found to affect the Mathews v. 
Eldridge balancing analysis”). 
 16Because we hold, infra, that Schmidt’s right to a pre-
suspension hearing was not clearly established, we do not 
consider whether extraordinary circumstances justifying 
suspension without a prior hearing were present in this case. 
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The issue in both Dykes and Jackson was the 
sufficiency of the post-deprivation union grievance 
procedures, not whether a pre-deprivation hearing was 
required.  Although it appears from the facts of both cases 
that the employees were not provided hearings prior to their 
termination, this argument was not raised on appeal in either 
case and it is apparent from our opinions in these cases that 
we did not consider it.  Because we did not consider the 
availability of a pre-deprivation hearing in Dykes and 
Jackson, and our reasoning did not address the contention that 
the employees in those cases were entitled to such a hearing, 
these cases cannot be read as holding that the availability of 
post-deprivation union grievance procedures relieves a public 
employer of the obligation to provide an employee with a 
hearing prior to his termination or suspension without pay.  
See generally IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Intern. 
Partners, LLC., 438 F.3d 298, 311 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding of 
a case includes only the facts and reasoning essential to the 
holding). 
 
2. Schmidt’s Right to a Pre-Suspension 
Hearing Was Not Clearly Established 
Although absent extraordinary circumstances, Schmidt 
had a right to a hearing prior to his suspension, appellees are 
entitled to qualified immunity because this right was not 
clearly established at the time of his suspension.  “The 
relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is 
clearly established is whether it would be clear to a 
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the 
situation he confronted.”  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.  “‘This 
inquiry . . . must be undertaken in light of the specific context 
of the case, not as a broad general proposition,’ and turns on 
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the ‘objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in 
light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time 
it was taken.’”  Bayer, 577 F.3d at 192 (quoting Pearson, 555 
U.S. at 231).  
 
We begin our analysis by considering the clearly 
established legal rules at the time Schmidt was suspended in 
July of 2006.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Loudermill, 
470 U.S. at 542, clearly established that, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, certain state employees were entitled to a 
hearing prior to termination.  Cases from this Court also made 
clear that this rule applied to police officers.  See, e.g., 
Gniotek, 808 F.2d at 244.  However, it was not clearly 
established in 2006 whether this rule applied when 
appropriate post-suspension union grievance procedures were 
available to suspended employees.  Loudermill made clear 
that a pre-termination hearing was required even when a post-
termination administrative hearing was available, but 
Loudermill dealt with termination, not suspension.  We note 
that the District Court carefully considered the question and 
essentially concluded that Loudermill did not apply to 
Schmidt’s suspension, holding that, under Dykes and Jackson, 
the availability of the post-suspension union grievance 
process “cured” any failure to provide a pre-suspension 
hearing.17
                                                 
 17A district court’s error of law at step one of the 
Saucier procedure is relevant, but not dispositive, when 
considering whether a right is clearly established.  In some 
cases, a lower court’s error is simply an oversight, rather than 
evidence that the law is not clearly established.  See, e.g., 
Dee, 549 F.3d at 230 (finding that employee’s suspension 
clearly implicated due process concerns despite lower court’s 
 
24 
 
 
In addition to our cases and decisions of the Supreme 
Court, “we routinely consider decisions by other Courts of 
Appeals as part of our ‘clearly established’ analysis when we 
have not yet addressed the right asserted by the plaintiff.”  
Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(collecting cases).  At the time of Schmidt’s suspension, other 
circuits had concluded that “due process requires pre-
termination notice and an opportunity to respond even where 
a [collective bargaining agreement] provides for post-
termination procedures that fully compensate wrongfully 
terminated employees.”  Chaney v. Suburban Bus Div. of the 
Regional Transp. Auth., 52 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 1995); see 
also Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (hearing required prior to demotion of employee, 
even where post-demotion union grievance procedures were 
available); Cotnoir v. University of Me. Sys., 35 F.3d 6, 12 
(1st Cir. 1994) (hearing required prior to termination of 
employee, even where post-termination union grievance 
procedures were available).  These cases did not clearly 
establish that Schmidt was entitled to a hearing before being 
suspended – as opposed to being terminated. 
 
In light of the closeness of the question, the absence of 
clear precedent in this or other circuits, and the District 
                                                                                                             
finding of no due process protections), vacating and 
remanding 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21448 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 
2007); Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(finding that excessively tight handcuffs violated clearly 
established Fourth Amendment law despite lower court’s 
finding of no excessive force), rev’g 230 F. Supp. 2d 619, 622 
(E.D. Pa. 2002). 
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Court’s thoughtful conclusion, we cannot say that “it would 
be clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was 
unlawful in the situation” presented to appellees in this case.   
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.  Accordingly, the appellees are 
entitled to qualified immunity and the District Court correctly 
granted summary judgment to the appellees on Schmidt’s 
suspension claim. 
 
C.  Schmidt’s Termination Claim 
Schmidt’s termination claim is much more 
straightforward than his suspension claim.  We agree with the 
District Court’s holding that Schmidt was provided with 
adequate process before he was discharged.  As we have 
explained above, a pre-termination hearing “need not be 
elaborate.”  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545.  An employee is 
entitled to “notice of the charges against him, an explanation 
of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his 
side of the story.”  Id.  “The pretermination hearing may be 
informal so long as it affords the employee an opportunity to 
make any ‘plausible arguments that might . . . prevent 
discharge.’”   Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. 
Tucker, 868 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
We have specifically addressed the adequacy of notice 
provided to police officers in a pre-disciplinary hearing in two 
cases.  See Copeland v. Phila. Police Dep’t, 840 F.2d 1139 
(3d Cir. 1988); Gniotek, 808 F.2d at 244.  In Gniotek, police 
officers participated in a hearing prior to their suspension and 
subsequent termination for accepting bribes.  Id. at 244-45.  
At the hearing, each officer was provided a form stating “We 
are questioning you concerning testimony presented in 
Federal Court under oath by Eugene Boris an admitted 
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number writer, that he paid $60 per month for an extended 
period beginning in 1982 for protection of his illegal 
activities.”  Id. at 244.  We held: 
 
This statement, clearly, gave Gniotek notice of 
the charges and nature of the evidence against 
him.  It was of such specificity to allow Gniotek 
the opportunity to determine what facts, if any, 
within his knowledge might be presented in 
mitigation of or in denial of the charges . . . 
[U]nder the standards enunciated in Loudermill, 
this notice satisfied the demands of due process. 
Id. at 244.   
 In Copeland, a police department received allegations 
that a police officer was using drugs and requested that the 
officer provide a urine sample for drug testing.  840 F.2d at 
1142-43.  In an interview with a police inspector, the officer 
was informed that his urinalysis showed that he had been 
using drugs.  Id. at 1145.  The officer declined to comment 
and two days later he was suspended and given a notice of 
suspension with intent to dismiss.  Id.  We held that the 
inspector’s statement provided the officer with sufficient 
notice of the grounds for his suspension for due process 
purposes, even though the officer was not informed of the 
details of his urinalysis test and did not learn of the formal 
charges against him until two days after the interview.  Id. at 
1145-46. 
 
There is no dispute that Schmidt was given prior notice 
of the hearing which described in sufficient detail the conduct 
that was the basis for his suspension.  Schmidt’s only 
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objection is that appellees did not identify the specific rules 
that they claimed his conduct violated.  In light of the simple 
notices we upheld in Gniotek and Copeland, we conclude that 
the notice provided to Schmidt of the termination hearing did 
not violate due process.18
 
 
III.  Conclusion 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the orders of the 
District Court, granting judgment to the appellees in both 
actions brought by Schmidt.  
                                                 
18In light of this holding, we need not address whether 
Schmidt provided sufficient evidence of Superintendent 
Shaffer’s involvement in his termination. 
